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BREXIT AND IRISH CONSUMERS1 
Martina Lawless and Edgar Morgenroth* 
ABSTRACT 
Concerns about the impact of Brexit on the Irish economy have tended to focus 
on the challenges to exporting firms. However, as the UK is a significant source of 
imports into the Irish economy and there is considerable integration of the retail 
sectors in both countries, the imposition of tariffs or other increases in trading 
costs could pass through to increased prices for Irish consumers. This paper 
examines the contribution of UK imports to overall household expenditure in 
Ireland and their exposure to tariffs and other cost increases from possible 
restrictions on trade. Our approach generates an estimate of potential increases 
in the level of CPI of between 2 per cent and 3.1 per cent. In the estimated 
scenarios, these increases are the equivalent of between €892 (increase in non-
tariff trade costs) and €1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases) in the annual 
cost of its consumption basket for the average household. This assumes that 
there is no switching or changes in expenditure patterns in response to the cost 
increases so gives an upper bound to the cost increase effects. We also find that 
these effects are very unevenly distributed across households. Households with 
lower income levels would face considerably higher percentage increases as they 
tend to consume a higher share of products that would be most affected by 
increases in tariffs and trade costs.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the decision of the UK government to leave the EU there has been 
significant evidence put forward that the potential introduction of trade barriers 
could impact negatively on Irish exporters and on the Irish economy overall. One 
further channel through which Brexit could impact on Ireland that has received 
less attention so far is though price increases on imports. The UK is a significant 
source of imports into the Irish economy with 28 per cent of Irish goods imports 
originating in the UK in 2016 as compared to the UK accounting for 14.6 per cent 
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of Irish goods exports. Irish consumers and Irish firms could therefore face 
significant price increases in the event of tariffs being applied to these products. 
 
The potential effect of Brexit on consumer prices was highlighted in the early 
scoping study prior to the referendum undertaken by Barrett et al. (2015). This 
raised a concern about the high level of Irish imports sourced in the UK and that 
the integrated nature of retail sectors could result in the exposure of households 
to increased prices and, also on a wider scale, that this could have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of the Irish economy and raise prices for 
consumers.  
 
Brexit may impact on consumer prices through a number of channels. Firstly, 
Brexit has already impacted significantly on the Sterling/Euro exchange rate and 
these changes have an impact on import prices and consumer prices. A large 
literature has considered the degree to which exchange rate changes pass 
through to prices. This has found that exchange rate changes are typically not 
completely passed through to prices and depends on the market structure (see 
Auer and Schoenle, 2016). For Ireland, Morgenroth (2000) showed that while 
exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on Irish exports to the UK in the 
short-run, the long-run impact is zero. More recent evidence by Reddan and Rice 
(2017) found that only 10 per cent of the exchange rate change is passed through 
to consumer prices in Ireland. 
 
Secondly, if Brexit results in increased trade barriers between the UK and the EU 
then this is likely to reduce competition in the Irish market from abroad, and 
lower competition allows local firms to charge higher prices. Research has indeed 
shown that tariffs lead to higher prices being charged by local firms (Konings and 
Vandenbusche, 2005). 
 
Thirdly, trade barriers such as tariffs raise the cost of traded products, which may 
be passed through to the consumer in higher retail prices. Surprisingly, the 
literature on the direct effect of trade barriers on consumer prices is quite 
limited. Blonigen and Haynes (2002) found that antidumping duties, that is tariff 
duties designed to prevent the importation of goods at prices likely to damage 
domestic firms, are more than fully passed through. One recent related paper by 
Hwang (2016) on South Korea examined tariff reductions in the aftermath of 
joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and found that how price falls in this 
case were passed on to consumers was determined strongly by the level of 
competition within the retail sector and within product categories. Similar results 
were obtained by De Loecker et al. (2016) who found that some of the benefits of 
lower tariffs were absorbed by firms through higher mark-ups. It is likely that the 
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level of competition and availability of substitutes would also be significant 
factors in how price increases would be passed onto consumers. A recent paper 
by Clarke et al. (2017) analysed the potential effect of Brexit on consumer prices 
in the UK. They found that the imposition of tariffs under a scenario where trade 
between the UK and the EU is subject to WTO tariffs would increase the average 
cost of living in the UK by 1 per cent. Their analysis also showed that the impact 
differs across households with the unemployed, families with children and 
pensioners being most affected. 
 
This paper focuses on the consumer side of Brexit by looking at the contribution 
of UK imports to overall household expenditure in Ireland and how exposed this 
might be to tariffs or other related cost increases. The key question posed is to 
quantify how substantial this effect might be and how it could vary across 
households. We do this by combining data on trade, tariffs and other costs that 
could increase in the event of the UK exit from the EU and comparing this to Irish 
household expenditure. 
 
Our approach generates an estimate of potential increases in the level of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of between 2 per cent and 3.1 per cent. These 
increases are the equivalent of between €892 (increase in non-tariff trade costs) 
and €1,360 (tariffs plus other trade cost increases) in the annual cost of its 
consumption basket for the average household. This increase is calculated in the 
absence of any change in consumer behaviour away from these products. While 
some expenditure shifts would be expected in response to prices changes, the 
extent to which households adjust depends in large part on the range of 
substitutes available and their prices. We do not model the dynamics of that 
response, keeping the focus of the paper on measuring the size of the initial price 
shift to which Irish consumers could potentially be exposed. The estimated 
effects in terms of the increase in the household basket could therefore be 
regarded as upper bounds of the household impact. We also make no assumption 
regarding further exchange rate movements which could offset or amplify the 
effects.  
 
Of possibly more concern than the size of this average impact is that these effects 
are very unevenly distributed across households. We show that households with 
lower income levels consume a higher share of products that would be most 
affected by increases in tariffs and trade cost and the overall effect is 
inversely related to the household income decile.  
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DATA SOURCES 
In order to answer the question of how Brexit might impact on Irish CPI we 
combine data from a number of different sources – on trade flows, tariffs, non-
tariff barriers and household expenditure. This section describes each source in 
turn and the assumptions that underlie the subsequent analysis. 
 
Trade data 
The first source is trade data from the customs records collected by the Central 
Statistics Office which we used to examine at a product-by-product level what 
Ireland imports from the UK. These data are collected at the 6-digit product level 
as defined by the international Harmonized System (HS). We also look at total 
Irish imports for each product in order to generate the UK share of total imports. 
 
Tariff data 
The second source of data relates to our estimates of how significant price 
increases could be in the introduction of tariffs. The assumption made is that in 
the absence of a trade deal or transitional arrangement, the EU’s register of 
‘most favoured nation’ tariffs listed with the WTO would be the fall-back position, 
either come March 2019 or at the end of a transition period. The uncertainty of 
both the final arrangements and their timing need to be borne in mind 
throughout the discussion of the following scenarios. The WTO schedule that we 
use as our baseline scenario are the tariffs applied by the EU to all external 
countries without a trade agreement and are therefore the highest level of tariffs 
that would be likely to apply, as any specific deal would be to lower tariffs on 
some if not all product lines. The WTO tariffs vary widely across products with 
many subject to a zero tariff while some products are subject to a tariff as high as 
80 per cent (for some beef products). Tariffs can be applied in two different ways 
– most of the WTO tariff rates are ad-valorem tariffs (i.e. charged as a percentage 
of the value of the goods being shipped) while others are applied as a charge per 
unit quantity or by weight. In some instances, the two methods are combined, as 
for example in the case of the tariff on fresh or chilled boneless bovine meat 
which is 12.8 per cent of the value of the product plus €303 per 100 kg (Lawless 
and Morgenroth, 2016). This implies that the aggregate impact of Brexit under a 
WTO scenario is a function of the detailed trade patterns and considerable 
variation in the impacts across countries, sectors, firms and households are 
possible. So far, the focus has been largely on the cross-country impacts with a 
focus on exporting firms with limited focus on how households might be exposed 
to changes in the trading environment.  
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Non-tariff barriers 
As well as tariffs, potential increases in prices could be passed on to consumers 
arising from cost increases if additional customs procedures or other barriers to 
trade are applied. It is important to stress that many of these non-tariff barriers 
could come into place even in the event of a deal reducing tariffs considerably 
from their WTO levels, particularly if the UK exits the Customs Union. For this 
reason, we treat non-tariff barriers as our lower-bound estimate and an outcome 
combining WTO tariffs plus non-tariff barriers as our upper estimate. As it is 
difficult to envisage the imposition of tariffs without any degree of non-tariff 
barriers (even in basic administration costs) being incurred, we present 
calculations based on either non-tariff barriers alone or based on a combination 
of non-tariff barriers and tariffs. In order to estimate the non-tariff barrier effects, 
we take data from the estimates generated by the World Bank by Kee et al. 
(2009) and described in IntertradeIreland (2017). ‘Non-tariff barriers’ is the term 
applied to a wide range of policy measures other than tariffs that restrict or 
discourage international trade flows. Some examples of non-tariff barriers on 
goods trade can include quantity limits, subsidies to domestic production and 
implicit barriers arising from technical requirements such as licensing, labelling, 
standards and sanitary and phyto-sanitary rules (rules designed to protect health 
and food safety). Non-tariff barriers also include administrative requirements that 
add cost or delays to imports such as customs inspections and documentation.  
 
Given their variety and complexity, non-tariff barriers can be difficult to measure. 
Research carried out by Kee et al. (2009) on behalf of the World Bank combine a 
wide range of non-tariff barriers at a detailed product level and convert them to 
an ad-valorem tariff (or price) equivalent. Their work provides estimates for 4,575 
HS six-digit product categories which we match to the trade flow data from the 
CSO. Their central estimate for all non-tariff barriers is equivalent to applying a 12 
per cent tariff. However, the tariff equivalent on some products can be many 
times this average effect. In over half of the products where non-tariff barriers 
are in effect, they find that the price effect of the non-tariff barrier is higher than 
the tariff.  
 
Looking at the pattern of non-tariff barriers across countries, Kee et al. (2009) 
show that richer countries tend to impose lower barriers on trade. On this basis, 
we assume that any potential non-tariff barriers between the EU and UK would 
be one-quarter of those estimated by Kee et al. (2009) given that the EU and UK 
will be starting from a point of completely harmonised regulatory and safety 
standards. This is in line with the approach taken by Dhingra et al. (2016) when 
estimating the effect on the UK economy of the UK exiting the EU. They use non-
tariff barrier estimates of EU-US trade but assume that the level that would apply 
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to EU-UK trade would be between one-quarter (in their optimistic scenario) and 
three-quarters (in their pessimistic scenario) of the US level.  
 
Non-tariff barriers have moved to the forefront of a number of recent major 
trade negotiations. For example, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA)2 between the EU and Canada removes almost all tariffs on 
goods between the signatories with a small number of exceptions in agricultural 
products bringing it extremely close to complete free trade. The bulk of the CETA 
text revolves around the removal or reduction of non-tariff barriers in both goods 
and services, highlighting that these are considered significant impediments to 
trade.  
 
A further issue to be borne in mind in terms of non-tariff barriers affecting Irish 
retail prices is the extent to which imports from other countries to Ireland are 
transhipped through the UK. Comparing trade and transport data sources, 
Lawless and Morgenroth (2017) estimate that approximately 11 per cent of Irish 
import volumes from markets other than the UK are transported across the UK 
‘land-bridge’. Although no tariffs would be imposed on these imports post-Brexit 
as they do not originate in the UK, there is the possibility that increased 
administration costs (e.g. to verify that the goods are destined for Ireland and not 
for the UK domestic market) and associated port delays could have a knock-on 
effect of increasing the cost of delivering those products to Ireland.  
 
Household expenditure data 
The level of current trade from the UK to Ireland and associated potential price 
increases are then combined with measures of how important these products are 
in the consumption expenditure baskets of households in order to gauge how this 
might affect different households and overall CPI. The data for this come from 
the Household Budget Survey (HBS) collected by the CSO in 2015-2016. The HBS 
is a large scale survey (over 6,800 households) that collects information on 
household expenditure patterns in order to appropriately weight price changes 
by their importance in household consumption for the Consumer Price Index. It 
provides very detailed information on expenditure at a product level, by 
households overall and also by income decile. We use the overall expenditure 
shares to generate our CPI aggregate estimate and provide additional evidence 
on the distributional differences of these trade related price increases across 
different household income groups (specifically we divide households into ten 
groups – deciles – based on their income levels).  
 
                                                          
 
2  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter.  
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The first item of note in gauging household exposure to tariff related price 
increases is that the share of goods in the household basket declines considerably 
as household income increases. Households in higher income deciles tend to 
spend relatively more on services and are therefore somewhat less exposed to 
increases in good prices as is shown in Figure 1. On average across all households, 
approximately 45 per cent of expenditure is on goods and the other 55 per cent is 
on services (with housing being the single largest component). This share of 
goods in total expenditure ranges from 53 per cent in the third decile to just 35 
per cent in the highest income group.  
 
We choose a number of specific examples of products where expenditure shares 
across household deciles differ and show these in Figure 2. We particularly note 
that the share of household expenditure on food declines considerably as 
household income increases. The poorest household groups allocate up to 15 per 
cent of their total expenditure to food and this declines to just 8 per cent for the 
highest income group. This is an important determinant of our overall results as 
food products have the highest tariff listings in the EU’s WTO tariff schedule and 
this therefore gives an early indication of how the distribution of post-Brexit 
tariffs could differ in their impact across household types. Other expenditure 
areas where we find considerable household income variation, such as the lowest 
income households spending a much higher fraction of their total expenditure on 
fuel and light (9 per cent compared to 3 per cent in higher income households), 
will be less affected by Brexit as tariffs in these product areas tend to be low. 
Working in the opposite direction, higher income households tend to spend 
somewhat more on vehicles and motor fuels. The share of spending in other 
areas such as alcohol and electronics are flatter over the income distribution. 
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FIGURE 1 SHARE OF GOODS IN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE BY INCOME DECILE 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Household Budget Survey, 2015-2016. 
FIGURE 2 VARIATION IN EXPENDITURE SHARES BY INCOME DECILE  
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from Household Budget Survey, 2015-2016. 
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ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
In order to estimate how increased import costs might affect prices of consumer 
goods we combine the data sources described above in a number of different 
steps. The first of these is to match the WTO tariffs and product level estimates of 
the potential cost increases associated with non-tariff barriers to the imports 
from the UK and calculate the corresponding price effect. This gives a range of 
price increases at a product-by-product level. 
 
These products then need to be distinguished between intermediate and capital 
goods that would be primarily used by firms, and consumption goods used by 
households. Our method of doing this was to match the product codes used in 
the trade data (HS codes) to those used in the Household Budget (COICOP codes). 
In order to line up the two different systems, the trade codes were first 
converted into an intermediate classification called the Common Product 
Classification (CBC) and then converted again into the COICOP classification using 
concordances from the UN. This procedure gives us a matching between the 
imports and products reported as being purchased by households.  
 
In order to allocate the price increases we make an assumption that any product 
listed in the HBS is purchased entirely by households. This will give an upper 
estimate as many of the products reported in the trade data (for example tea, 
coffee and laptop computers) will also be purchased by firms. However, although 
this may overestimate the direct effect of price increases faced by the consumer, 
the indirect effect should also be considered as increased costs for inputs used by 
Irish firms may also in many cases be passed on to the final consumer.  
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FIGURE 3 CONSUMPTION AND INTERMEDIATE GOOD TARIFF AND NTB EXPOSURES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 3 shows how the tariff and non-tariff barrier cost increases vary across 
consumer and intermediate (all non-consumer) products. The non-tariff barrier 
(NTB) estimated price increases are over four times greater for consumption 
products than for non-consumption goods. Combining the non-tariff barriers with 
the WTO-registered tariffs generates a total price increase exposure of 5.5 per 
cent on UK imports of non-consumption goods and an increase of up to 21 per 
cent for consumption goods.3  
 
The next step of the methodology is to estimate how important the UK imports 
are in overall household spending for each product. To do this we calculate 
imports from the UK as a proportion of the total purchase of those goods by the 
households. However, as already mentioned some of the imported products, 
even though classified here as consumption products, may also be purchased by 
firms. To minimise any overestimate of household exposure, we also compare the 
UK import share to total imports in each product category and use the lower of 
the two if there is any discrepancy. For example, when expressed as a share of 
household expenditure, imports of tea and coffee from the UK exceeded 100 per 
cent so this was replaced by the UK share of total imports in this product 
category which was 54 per cent.  
 
                                                          
 
3  The WTO tariff impact alone on intermediates is 2.5 per cent whereas the tariff impact on consumption products is 
over 7 per cent.   
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We now have an importance weight on each product for the UK share of each 
product. Figure 4 shows how the overall price increase for goods is generated by 
aggregating across all products, weighted by the share of these products 
imported from the UK. The price effect bars show how this scales down the 
overall tariff impacts shown in Figure 3, as they are now multiplied by the market 
share of the UK imports to give an overall impact on the price levels of these 
goods in the Irish economy. The CPI bars then show how these price increases 
translate into an overall CPI effect by further weighting the products by their 
importance in the household expenditure basket. 
 
FIGURE 4 PRICE INCREASES AND AGGREGATE CPI EFFECT 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
The tables in the Appendix give more detail on this by showing for each sector 
the tariff or non-tariff barrier increase in the cost of imports from the UK, the 
share of the UK in total expenditure and the combination to give the overall 
implied price effect. To take the example of bread and cereals, Table A.1 shows 
that the estimated tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers on these products is 36 
per cent. Imports from the UK are equivalent to 59 per cent of Irish household 
expenditure in this product category so the impact on the total sector price of 
tariffs on the UK imports would be 21 per cent (36 per cent times 59 per cent). 
The concentration of the highest non-tariff barriers on food products is evident in 
Table A.1 with meat imports facing a 62 per cent tariff equivalent and milk, 
cheese and eggs facing a 43 per cent tariff equivalent. Table A.2 shows the 
combined non-tariff barrier estimates and Table A.3 the direct effect of tariffs 
alone.  
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The tariff schedule shows that food and clothing tariffs are generally well in 
excess of 10 per cent while those on other manufactured products are relatively 
modest – zero rates on medical products and motor fuels, 1 per cent on 
electronics and 3 per cent on household appliances for example. Of 
manufactured products, only motor vehicles (cars, motorcycles and parts) face 
significant tariff rates at approximately 8 per cent.4 As discussed earlier, the 
method we followed was to apply tariffs and non-tariff barriers at the most 
disaggregated level possible and it should be noted that the rates summarised for 
the broad categories in the tables do mask some substantial variations even 
within the same category – meat tariffs for example range from approximately 10 
per cent on chicken to over 80 per cent on some beef products. 
 
The overall impact on Irish price levels of changes in trade costs on imports from 
the UK will also crucially depend on how important the UK is as a source of that 
product. Given the integration of retail and grocery markets, it is perhaps not 
surprising to see in Table A.1 that the UK is the origin of a substantial share of 
many products – most particularly in fresh and processed foods but also in 
household and personal non-durables (categories which include cleaning 
products and toiletries for example). It should be emphasised again at this point 
that such price increases on particular products would be likely to result in some 
changes in consumer choices being made but it is not possible to gauge in 
advance how large these would be without more detailed information on 
substitutes available and levels of competition in different product areas.  
 
The cross-product detail on non-tariff barriers in Table A.1 (and the combined 
effects of tariffs and non-tariff barriers in Table A.2) also shows a sharp difference 
between the impacts on food and manufactured products. They suggest in fact 
that even in the event of a trade deal that removes tariffs entirely, there may be 
a significant price impact on Irish consumers unless such a deal also minimises 
non-tariff barriers.  
 
The final step is to translate these product level price changes into an overall CPI 
impact which is done by aggregating over all the price increases for each product 
and weighting them by the importance of that product in household 
consumption. This generates an estimate of potential increases in the level of CPI 
of between 2 per cent in the non-tariff barriers scenario and 3.1 per cent when 
both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are applied. These increases are the equivalent 
 
                                                          
 
4  The trade data do not distinguish between new and second-hand cars. 
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of between €892 and €1,360 in the annual cost of its consumption basket for the 
average household. The relatively larger impact of the non-tariff barrier costs 
compared to the tariffs is noteworthy although it should be emphasised that the 
international estimates used to proxy these costs are likely to be less accurate 
than the tariff estimates which come directly from the EU schedule published 
with the WTO. 
 
It should further be stressed that the CPI increase calculated here does not take 
account of any change in consumer behaviour in reaction to price increases, 
which is beyond the scope of the present exercise. The extent to which 
households adjust depends in large part on the range of substitutes available, 
ease of switching both for consumers and for retailer supply chains and the 
prices, which could also be affected by exchange rate movements (which to date 
have made UK imports more competitive). We do not model the dynamics of that 
response, keeping the focus of the paper on measuring the size of the price shift 
to which Irish consumers could potentially be exposed.  
 
The Household Budget Survey also provides detail on the expenditure patterns of 
different types of households. Dividing households into ten equally sized groups 
based on their income in Figure 5 shows that our estimated impact of post-Brexit 
cost increases has a substantial distributional effect. Households in the lowest 
income decile face increases of around 70 per cent higher than those in the 
highest income group. Households in the lowest income group would face a 4 per 
cent increase in prices in the event of both tariffs and non-tariff barrier obstacles 
being implemented. Table 1 converts the percentage increases into monetary 
amounts based on the annual average expenditure of each household income 
group. The 4 per cent increase for the lowest income households is equivalent to 
a €634 annual increase in cost of their current expenditure basket for these 
households, or €12 extra on their current weekly spending of €305. The 
percentage change effects are similar for the bottom three groups and then taper 
off gradually as household income increases. These generate higher monetary 
amounts however as spending levels are also going up. The 4.2 per cent increase 
for the third income group is equivalent to extra costs of €1,104 and the 3.8 per 
cent increase for the fourth group is an increase of €1,191. For the highest 
income households, the effects in the worst-case scenario would be 2.4 per cent. 
This is equivalent to an increased cost of their spending basket of €2,086 per 
year. The difference in percentage impact is largely due to the higher share of 
household expenditure accounted for by food by lower income households.  
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FIGURE 5 VARIATION ACROSS HOUSEHOLD INCOME DECILES 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
 
TABLE 1 INCREASE IN BASKET COST BY INCOME DECILE 
 
Non-tariff barriers 
€ 
Tariffs + NTB 
€ 
1st decile  419  634 
2nd decile  531  809 
3rd decile  727  1,104 
4th decile  780  1,191 
5th decile  849  1,294 
6th decile  933  1,425 
7th decile  1,013  1,549 
8th decile  1,130  1,724 
9th decile  1,181  1,812 
10th decile  1,361  2,086 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al., 2009). 
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changes, a number of characteristics of different household income levels play an 
important role. Firstly, the share of goods in the household basket declines 
considerably as household income increases, with households in higher income 
deciles spending 35 per cent of their income on goods compared to 53 per cent in 
the third decile. Secondly, looking at specific categories of goods, we find that the 
share of household expenditure on food declines considerably as household 
income increases. This is an important determinant of our overall results as food 
products have the highest tariff listings in the EU’s WTO tariff schedule, which we 
assume would be the fall-back position in the absence of a trade deal or 
transition agreement by the Brexit deadline of March 2019.  
 
Comparing tariff and non-tariff barrier cost increases across consumer and 
intermediate inputs shows consumer goods to be considerably more exposed to 
changes in trade regime. The WTO tariff impact on products used as intermediate 
inputs for further processing is 2.5 per cent whereas the impact on consumption 
products is over 7 per cent. A similar pattern applies to estimates of non-tariff 
barriers which also fall disproportionately heavily on final consumption products, 
most notably food. 
 
Aggregating over the individual price increases for each product and weighting 
them by the importance of that product in household consumption gives us an 
estimate of potential increases in the level of CPI. Our estimate impacts range 
from 2 per cent in the non-tariff barrier scenario to an impact of 3.1 per cent 
when both tariffs and non-tariff barriers are applied. These increases are the 
equivalent of between €892 and €1,360 in the annual cost of its consumption 
basket for the average household. This assumes no change in consumer spending 
patterns as we try here to focus on the change in prices faced by households at 
the point of the imposition of a new trade regime. Given the size of the possible 
increases for some product categories, some change in consumer behaviour away 
from these products would be likely although we do not model this explicitly. The 
extent of switching would depend on a number of factors such as the range of 
substitutes available and their prices. In some instances, the effect could be of a 
reduction in the number of varieties on offer in certain product groups if the price 
increases considerably.  
 
We also find that the potential post-Brexit cost increases could have a substantial 
distributional effect. Households in the lowest income decile face increases of 
around 70 per cent higher than those in the highest income group. Households in 
the lowest income group would face a 4 per cent increase in prices in the event of 
both tariffs and non-tariff barrier obstacles being implemented compared to 2.4 
per cent for the highest income group. This is largely due to the higher share of 
household expenditure accounted for by food by lower income households.   
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A.1 NTB ESTIMATES 
  
NTB tariff 
equivalent 
% 
UK import  
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 36  59  21  
Meat 62  24  15  
Fish and seafood 20  57  11  
Milk, cheese and eggs 79  38  30  
Oils and fats 46  27  13  
Fruit 25  14  3  
Vegetables 27  14  4  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 55  32  18  
Processed foods 27  44  12  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 29  54  16  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 27  56  15  
Spirits 9  27  2  
Wine 14  3  0  
Beer 6  8  0  
Tobacco 53  3  1  
Garments and clothing accessories 18  22  4  
Shoes and other footwear 24  13  3  
Household maintenance and repair goods 4  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 1  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  5  46  2  
Personal non-durable goods  1  68  1  
Furniture 8  36  3  
Household appliances and tools 3  38  1  
Reading material and stationery 1  27  0  
Vehicles 8  11  1  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 4  36  1  
Toys and games 10  31  3  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey and non-tariff barriers (Kee et al, 2009). 
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TABLE A.2 WTO TARIFFS + NTB ESTIMATES 
  
Combined 
tariff equiv. 
% 
UK import 
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 52  59  30  
Meat 100  24  24  
Fish and seafood 30  57  17  
Milk, cheese and eggs 122  38  46  
Oils and fats 69  27  19  
Fruit 34  14  5  
Vegetables 36  14  5  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 84  32  27  
Processed foods 34  44  15  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 37  54  20  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 40  56  23  
Spirits 16  27  4  
Wine 22  3  1  
Beer 7  8  1  
Tobacco 91  3  2  
Garments and clothing accessories 30  22  6  
Shoes and other footwear 35  13  5  
Household maintenance and repair goods 7  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 2  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  9  46  4  
Personal non-durable goods  2  68  1  
Furniture 12  36  4  
Household appliances and tools 6  38  2  
Reading material and stationery 3  27  1  
Vehicles 16  11  2  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 7  36  3  
Toys and games 14  31  4  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey, WTO tariff rates and non-tariff barriers 
 (Kee et al, 2009). 
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TABLE A.3 WTO TARIFFS 
  
WTO tariff 
rate 
% 
UK import 
share 
% 
Implied price 
increase 
% 
Bread and cereals 16  59  9  
Meat 38  24  9  
Fish and seafood 10  57  6  
Milk, cheese and eggs 43  38  16  
Oils and fats 23  27  6  
Fruit 9  14  1  
Vegetables 9  14  1  
Sugar, jam, chocolate and confectionery 29  32  9  
Processed foods 8  44  3  
Coffee, tea and cocoa 7  54  4  
Mineral waters, soft drinks, juices 13  56  7  
Spirits 7  27  2  
Wine 8  3  0  
Beer 0  8  0  
Tobacco 38  3  1  
Garments and clothing accessories 11  22  2  
Shoes and other footwear 10  13  1  
Household maintenance and repair goods 3  5  0  
Fuel and light 0  21  0  
Electronic, photographic and IT 1  18  0  
Household non-durable goods  4  46  2  
Personal non-durable goods 1  68  0  
Furniture 4  36  2  
Household appliances and tools 3  38  1  
Reading material and stationery 1  27  0  
Vehicles 8  11  1  
Motor fuel 0  42  0  
Medical and therapeutic products 0  11  0  
Jewellery and watches 4  36  1  
Toys and games 4  31  1  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CSO trade data, Household Budget Survey and WTO tariff rates. 
 
